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Introduction

If I am long one million dollars in General Motors, and I am short one million dollars in Ford, am I still long one million dollars in General Motors?
Dealers in competitive dealership markets take on inventory risk of the securities in which they make a market. There is an extensive literature that shows us that dealers actively manage this risk by controlling individual asset inventories 2 . However, typically, dealers make a market not just in one security, but in a large number of securities. For example, each of the 'wholesalers' on the NASDAQ, and about three-fourths of the dealers on the LSE make a market in over hundred stocks 3 . Hence, dealers' management of inventory risk, and their trading behavior, should arguably be based not on inventories at the individual security level but on overall inventories aggregated across their total portfolio of securities. In this paper we examine if this is indeed the case.
The importance of correlated exposures in the context of market-making was first emphasized by Ho and Stoll (1983) (hereafter H&S). They show that the dealer's trading behavior in a given stock should be guided (not by her ordinary inventory holdings in that stock but) by her equivalent inventory in that stock. This equivalent inventory is simply the dealer's ordinary inventory in that stock corrected for any reinforcing or offsetting effects arising from inventory positions in all other stocks with correlated returns.
2 Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) , Madhavan, and Smidt (1993) and Madhavan, and Sofianos (1998) analyse specialists' inventories on the NYSE; Lyons (1995) studies the inventory of one FX dealer; Mann, and Manaster (1996) examine behavior of scalpers in the Chicago futures market; Neuberger (1992) , and Snell, and Tonks (1998) study the aggregate inventory of all London equity dealers while Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) and Reiss and Werner (1998) examine individual dealer inventories. Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) document evidence consistent with active inventory control. 3 See Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (1999) and Naik and Yadav (1999) .
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More recently, Froot and Stein (1998) (hereafter F&S) examine the decision-making problem of financial intermediaries when some but not all risks can be hedged. They show that the attitude of an intermediary towards an additional unit of risk in a stock depends on its unhedgeable component and the amount of correlated unhedgeable risk she carries in her portfolio. Hence, dealer decision-making in the F&S framework depends on ordinary inventory (a significant proportion of the risk of which is unhedgeable or stock-specific) and on an unhedgeable equivalent inventory measure based (not on correlation in total returns, as in H&S, but) on correlation in unhedgeable returns. This measure is relevant for an equity dealer who hedges completely the market risk of her portfolio with futures contracts such as S&P 500 futures in the US or FTSE100 futures in London.
Clearly, from a theoretical perspective, equivalent inventories (total or unhedgeable),
rather than individual inventories, should govern dealers' trading behavior. However in practice, other factors also play an important role, factors not specifically incorporated in these theoretical models. For example, each market-making firm consists of a large number of individual dealers to whom trade related decision-making in different stocks is delegated. This decentralized structure provides incentives for the individual dealers (who take the actual trading and risk management decisions) to be concerned only about the ordinary inventory risk of the individual stocks managed by them, rather than the overall position of the dealer firm as a whole that also includes positions in correlated stocks of other individual dealers within the firm.
There are potentially two effects of the decentralized nature of market-making. First, there are difficulties in effectively sharing information in real time across the large number of dealers making a market in different but correlated stocks. And second, the performance of these individual dealers is evaluated, and their compensation is determined according to the 3 trading profits they generate in stocks assigned to them. Imposing constraints on the position of an individual dealer in a particular stock based on the inventory of another dealer in a correlated stock contaminates the clean performance evaluation measure and hence increases the firm's agency costs. As a result, with decentralized market-making, the influence of correlated risk exposures predicted by theoretical models is unlikely to get fully reflected in the trading behavior of the firm. Thus, the net influence of correlated exposures on dealers'
trading behavior can be determined only through empirical analyses.
In this paper, we use transactions audit-trail data from the London Stock Exchange (hereafter LSE) to investigate whether the trading behavior of dealers is governed by their total equivalent inventories as in the Ho and Stoll (1983) model, or by their unhedgeable equivalent inventories as in the Froot and Stein (1998) model, or by their ordinary inventories as in a decentralized market-making organizational framework (hereafter the decentralized market-making model). We examine four aspects of dealers' trading behavior: intensity of mean reversion in inventories, quote placement strategy, which dealer executes public and inter-dealer trades, and the quality of execution she offers to the trades.
We find that dealers' ordinary inventories exhibit stronger mean reversion than either of their equivalent inventories, that their quote changes are significantly related to changes in their ordinary inventories and not to either of their equivalent inventories, that dealers with divergent ordinary, rather than equivalent, inventories execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer trades, and dealers with divergent ordinary, rather than equivalent, inventories offer significantly better quality of execution 4 . These findings confirm that ordinary 4 During our sample period, the LSE (like NASDAQ) is a competing dealer market in which dealers' bid and ask quotes are displayed on a screen. However, public trades are typically executed through bilateral negotiations over the telephone and may receive price improvement. The dependence of terms of trade offered on size and type of trader has been investigated in the literature (Reiss and Werner, 1994) . This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the relation between inventories and quality of execution.
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inventories govern dealer decision-making, and hence that the trading behavior of dealers is best explained by the decentralized market-making model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the testable implications of Ho and Stoll (1983) , Froot and Stein (1998) and the decentralized marketmaking models. Section 3 describes the data and explains how ordinary and equivalent inventories are constructed. Section 4 describes the methodology used in investigating the issues and documents the empirical results. Section 5 describes the findings from numerous robustness checks. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Key implications of theoretical models
In this section, we describe the key testable implications of Ho and Stoll (1983), Froot and Stein (1998) and the decentralized market-making model. Ho and Stoll's (1983) The H&S model implies that the trading behavior of dealers in a stock will be governed by equivalent inventories rather than ordinary inventories of that stock. The emphasis is on two aspects: first, on the correlated risks arising from inventory positions in all other securities at a firm-wide level; and second, on total risk rather than the unhedgeable risk emphasised by F&S discussed below. Froot and Stein's (1998) model F&S argue that a financial intermediary cannot efficiently hedge all risks in capital markets, and show (see their Proposition 2, pp 64) that a financial intermediary will always wish to hedge fully its exposure to any tradeable risk. Their model implies that a dealer's attitude towards bidding for and pricing a block of shares will depend only on her attitude to the unhedgeable component of the risk. Hence, a dealer's trading behavior in a stock will depend on her inventory of that stock and the extent of correlated unhedgeable risk arising from her inventories in other stocks. That is, it would depend on an equivalent inventory defined on the basis of correlations in unhedgeable returns rather than correlations in total returns (as in H&S).
Key implications of
Key implications of the decentralized market-making model
As mentioned in the introduction, typically, market maker firms make a market not just in one security but in a large number of securities. These market-making firms delegate With decentralized market-making, there exist two reasons why dealers may be more concerned with individual asset inventories rather than the (total or unhedgeable) equivalent inventories. First, as a practical matter, there exist difficulties in sharing relevant information across a large number of dealers who work for the same firm but make a market in different stocks. This is especially true when a large number of individual dealers are negotiating and executing trades across a large number of securities almost on a continuous basis. There could arguably be some information sharing at the trading desk level, but it is likely to be very weak at the firm-wide level.
Second, the performance of these individual dealers is evaluated, and their compensation is determined according to the trading profits they generate in the stocks assigned to them. Giving the freedom to an individual dealer to manage the inventory of her stocks gives a clean measure of her contribution to the profitability of the business. It also helps efficiently specify the individual dealer's compensation package. Imposing restrictions on the position an individual dealer can take in a given stock, based on the inventories of other dealers in correlated stocks, contaminates the performance evaluation measure and hence increases agency costs 5 .
Thus in a decentralized market-making structure, due to information sharing costs or Our data set provides time-stamped details of all quotes and all transactions for all stocks traded on the LSE. It identifies the dealer participating in each transaction, whether the dealer bought or sold, and their dealing capacity in the transaction, i.e. whether they acted as agent representing an order from the public, or as principal trading on their own account.
Transactions data on the LSE has been used by several other researchers to explore interesting but different issues 6 . Most of these studies (eg Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan, 1998; Reiss and Werner, 1998) use data sets in which the codes of different dealers and brokers change 6 For example, Reiss and Werner (1994) study transaction costs; Snell and Tonks (1995) analyse components of the bid-ask spread; Gemmill (1996) , and Board and Sutcliffe (1995) examine the impact of different transparency rules on trading costs; Hansch and Neuberger (1996) explore trading strategies of market makers; Board, Vila, and Sutcliffe (1996) examine the commitment of different market makers as providers of liquidity and contributors to price discovery; Reiss and Werner (1998) investigate inter dealer trading on the LSE; Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1999) examine the effect of preferencing, internalization and best execution on trading costs; Naik and Yadav (1999) analyse the differences in the quality of execution offered by different dealers and different brokers; Naik and Yadav (2000) study changes in trading costs of public investors after the market reforms, and Hillier, Naik, and Yadav (1999a) and Hillier, Naik, and Yadav (1999b) respectively. To incorporate hedging of market-risk, we modify the calculation of regression coefficients in eq. (1). Instead of regressing total returns of stock k on total return of stock j, we now regress the "abnormal" or market-filtered returns (using the market model) earned by stock k on those earned by stock j during the five-year period to the start of our sample period.
As before, for UEI_FW, we sum the second term in eq.
(1) over all stocks k, where k varies from one to 1853. For UEI_ID, we sum the second term in eq. (1) only over the stocks belonging to the same industry group. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics relating to the twenty sample stocks listed in decreasing order of their turnover. The average daily total turnover of our sample stocks varies from £30.1 million in NatWest Bank to £0.4 million in WPP Group, the sample average being about £6 million. A significant proportion of the total turnover is due to public trading. The average daily public turnover varies from £16.3 million in NatWest Bank to £0.3 million in WPP Group, the sample average being £3.7 million. The average daily number of public trades of our sample stocks varies from 172 in NatWest Bank to 4 in First Leisure Corporation, the sample average being 42. The sample average size of public and inter-dealer trades (not reported) is respectively £112,000 and £210,000. Within our sample of twenty stocks, an average of about ten dealers deal in each stock. Four stocks have fourteen dealers or more while twelve stocks have ten dealers or fewer. such as size and book-to-market. Clearly, for the vast majority of our sample stocks, the level of dependence on systematic factors that generate correlations between stock returns is large in magnitude, and would ordinarily be expected to influence dealers' trading behavior, unless dealers care only about positions in the stocks they trade, either because they do not know the positions of other dealers or because of the nature of their performance evaluation measure.
Sample statistics
Having described the salient features of the data, we now proceed with our empirical investigation.
Empirical investigation
In this section, we examine which measure of inventory (total equivalent, unhedgeable equivalent and ordinary) explains best four different aspects of dealers' trading behavior.
First, we analyze the mean reversion in dealers' inventories and examine which inventory measure tends to revert to the mean most rapidly. Second, we analyze dealers' quote placement behavior and investigate which inventory measure is most associated with it. Third, we examine the extent to which a dealer's buy and sell trades are related to the divergence of her different inventory measures. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the quality of execution offered to trades by a dealer is related to the divergence of the different measures of her inventories.
Mean reversion in inventory
If dealers are risk averse or face inventory carrying costs, their inventories would display mean reversion. If the inventory of a dealer goes above (below) her target inventory level, she will potentially change her quotes and/or, during negotiation, offer better prices to attract order flow in a direction that brings her inventory towards the target. In a competitive dealership market, when a dealer has an extreme inventory position she can post competitive quotes on one side and has a better chance of executing order flow in that direction, resulting in relatively rapid reduction in the inventory imbalance. However, when a dealer's inventory is close to the median inventory, at that time she cannot post competitive quotes and therefore has a poor chance of executing the public order flow, resulting in a relatively slow reduction in the inventory imbalance. This argument implies mean reversion in relative inventories, i.e., relative to the inventory of the median dealer.
In competitive dealership markets, the strength of mean reversion should increase with the magnitude of the inventory level. Up to a certain level of deviation of inventory from the target level, dealers may not worry too much. But once the deviation reaches a threshold level, dealers may actively start managing their inventory risk exposure. This suggests that instead of a linear model, it may be more appropriate to use a threshold autoregressive piecewise linear model in inventory levels. Therefore, following Hansch et. al. (1998) , we estimate a piecewise linear model for mean reversion in inventories with the thresholds prespecified as corresponding to a distance of one standard deviation and two standard deviations from the mean on either side.
We examine which of the inventory measures tends to revert to the mean most rapidly by estimating the following regression In the context of the above, the difference in the mean reversion of ordinary and equivalent inventories is reported in the last four columns of Table 2 .We find that across all stocks the intensity of mean reversion in ordinary inventory is greater than that in equivalent inventories in all 20 (four inventory measures times five regimes) cases, and this difference is statistically significant in 18 out of these 20 cases. The results for high liquidity (FTSE-100) stocks separately and medium liquidity (FTSE-250) stocks separately are qualitatively similar as well. We also test the apparent dominance of ordinary inventories using an alternative approach. We compute, for each dealer i dealing in stock j, the pairwise (2); and the pre-scripts 'o' and 'e' represent ordinary and equivalent (either total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-desk based) inventories respectively. We then conduct a cross-sectional t-test to determine whether the average of these differences is significantly different from zero. Once again, we find that mean reversion in ordinary inventories is significantly greater than that in equivalent inventories (not reported).
The strong results above indicate that dealers care most about their ordinary inventory rather than either measure of their equivalent inventories, a finding that supports the implications of the decentralized market-making model relative to either the Ho and Stoll (1983) model or the Froot and Stein (1998) model.
Quote changes and inventory changes
In the inventory models of dealership markets, like Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais In theoretical models, the dealer with longest (shortest) inventory position posts lowest ask (highest bid) price. The testable empirical implications have to be formulated in the context of the institutional practice of dealers on the LSE. We know from Hansch et. al.
(1998) that LSE dealers follow the practice of having a constant quoted bid-ask spread in a stock, and this quoted bid-ask spread is identical for all dealers, and wider than the market spread, i.e. the difference between the best bid and best ask prices. As a result, at any point in time, a dealer's quote position is such that either her bid quote equals the best bid, or her ask quote equals the best ask, or both her quotes straddle the market spread. Moreover, starting from any one of these three positions, when a dealer decides to change the relative position of her quotes, she faces the choice of moving to either of the other two positions. This implies a total of six possible quote position changes that could be observed in the data. We summarize these six quote position changes in Table 3 .
The inventory changes associated with quote position changes should arguably be as follows. First consider a dealer who starts by being at the best bid or the best ask. When the dealer moves her quotes from posting the highest bid quote to posting the lowest ask quote, it represents a change from being an aggressive buyer to being an aggressive seller. This is consistent with the notion that during the time the dealer was posting the highest bid quote, she was able to buy a large quantity of stock, resulting in a significant increase in her inventory, which she is trying to reduce by posting the lowest ask quote. Therefore, the change in inventory of a dealer moving from posting the highest bid quote to posting the lowest ask quote must be positive and significant. By the same argument, the change in inventory of a dealer moving from posting the lowest ask quote to posting the highest bid quote must be negative and significant. Similarly, when a dealer moves her quotes from the highest bid (lowest ask) to straddling the market spread, the change in her inventory must be positive (negative) but not as large in magnitude when she moves her quotes to the opposite side of the market spread.
Next consider a dealer who starts from straddling the market spread but at some later point in time either posts the lowest ask quote or the highest bid quote. A move from straddling the market spread to posting the lowest ask quote suggests a keenness to sell and therefore implies a positive change in dealer's inventory. Similarly, a move from straddling the market spread to posting the highest bid suggests a keenness to buy and therefore implies a negative change in inventory. As before, the magnitude of the change in inventory when the dealer moves from straddling the market spread to either side of the market spread will be smaller than when she moves her quotes from one side of the market spread to the other side.
To test these implications of inventory models, we compute the change in a dealer's ordinary and equivalent inventories, whenever her quote position relative to the market spread undergoes a change (i.e., either when she gets on to the market spread or when she gets off the market spread). We average these changes across all dealers and across all stocks. Table 4 summarizes our findings. For notational convenience, in Table 4 we use the term 'Bid to Ask' to denote the quote transition scenario in which a dealer's quotes are at the bid side of the market spread at the start and then change to being at the ask side of the market spread. The In contrast, we do not observe any consistent and significant relation between changes in dealers' quotes and the changes in either measure of their equivalent inventories (see Table   4 columns three to seven). In fact, none of the quote changes are distinguishable from zero suggesting an absence of any relation between quote changes and either measure of equivalent inventory changes. The disaggregated results for high liquidity stocks and medium liquidity stocks separately (not reported) are also qualitatively very similar: there is a strong relation between quote changes and ordinary inventory changes but not equivalent inventory changes.
These findings indicate that dealers care most about their ordinary inventories and position their quotes in a way that reduce the imbalance in their ordinary inventory, rather than total or unhedgeable equivalent inventory. This result is against the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Froot and Stein (1998) models, but is consistent with the trading behavior of dealers predicted by the decentralized market-making model.
Inventories, public order flow execution, and inter-dealer trading
In theoretical models of competitive dealership markets, dealers with divergent inventories execute buy and sell orders. In this sub-section, we examine the level of ordinary and equivalent inventories of dealers executing public and inter-dealer trades to understand whether dealers with divergent ordinary inventories or dealers with divergent equivalent inventories execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer trades 9 . Since inventory effects are likely to be more pronounced for large-size trades as compared to medium-size or smallsize trades, we conduct our analysis separately for different trade-size (small, medium and large) categories. As average trade size differs considerably across stocks (see Table 1 ), we define small, medium and large trade-size in multiples of the NMS or the normal market size of that stock (defined at 2.5% of the average daily trading volume over the previous year).
Consistent with prior research conducted with LSE data, we define trades less than or equal to one NMS to be 'small', trades greater than one NMS but less than three NMS to be 'medium', and trades greater than or equal to three NMS to be 'large' 10 .
We examine whether dealers with the most divergent ordinary or equivalent inventory levels execute public orders and engage in inter-dealer trades. In particular, we measure the difference between the (ordinary or equivalent) inventory We find that the ordinary inventory distance differences explain extremely well which dealer executes large-size trades. In particular, across all stocks (see Table 5 The results for small inter-dealer trades are also qualitatively similar, dealers with ordinary inventories that deviate from the median by about 0.23σ trade with each other (tstatistic 22.92). The average ordinary inventory distance of the dealer executing small public trades is considerably smaller compared to that for small inter-dealer trades (0.03σ vis-à-vis 0.23σ ), yet it also continues to be positive and statistically significant. The average distance difference for small trades is small in magnitude potentially because dealers have to often execute retail public trades irrespective of the level of their inventory due to the institutional practice of order flow preferencing and for the sake of maintaining customer relationships.
Many market-makers are linked with specific retail service providers and brokers, and (for trades up to one NMS in size) are obliged to execute the trades sent by them at the best system prices, irrespective of their own quotes and their inventories underlying these quotes. These obligations and practices do not extend to inter-dealer trades. Even though the magnitude of average ordinary inventory distance is small for small public trades, the findings for smallsize trades are consistent with the findings with medium and large trades, and indicate very strongly that dealers with divergent ordinary inventory execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer trades.
In sharp contrast to the results for ordinary inventory, the average of the inventory distances are not significantly greater than zero at the five percent level either for public trades or for inter-dealer trades using either the total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industrydesk based equivalent inventory measures. Similarly, the results are not significantly different from zero either for high liquidity stocks or for medium liquidity stocks and for large, medium and small trades. Occasionally, the distance difference turns out to be statistically 21 significant at the ten percent level but it is of a sign opposite to that predicted by theoretical models. These results suggest the absence of any relationship between trade execution and either measure of the dealer's equivalent inventory.
Overall, the findings in Table 5 provide clear evidence that public trades and interdealer trades, irrespective of the size of the trade and the liquidity of the stocks, are executed by dealers with divergent ordinary inventories, and not by dealers with divergent total or unhedgeable, firm-wide or industry-desk based equivalent inventories. These findings strongly reject the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Froot and Stein (1998) 
Inventories and quality of execution
In inventory models of dealership market like Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , Ho and Stoll (1983) , and Biais (1993), a dealer's reservation prices to buy or sell are a monotone function of her inventory. If inventory considerations are important, one would expect these to be reflected in the quality of execution offered to a trade i.e., effective spread charged by the dealer executing the trade. We define the Effective Spread ES τ charged for trade τ in relation to the prevailing mid-price defined as the average of the best bid and the best ask price.
Hence, for a public buy (i.e. dealer sell) trade:
And for a public sell (ie dealer buy) trade:
The results of Hansch et. al. (1999) indicate that the effective spread charged is a 22 function of stock specific factors, the inside spread, and on whether the particular trade was preferenced, and whether it was internalised 11 . There is also documented evidence that the temporary price impact of large public buys is significantly different from that of large public sells (e.g. Keim and Madhavan, 1996) , and this can arguably cause dealers to behave differently when they sell compared to when they buy. Hence, we run the following regression separately for public-buys and for public-sells using all measures of equivalent inventory: According to inventory models of dealership markets, the greater the inventory of a dealer, the keener she is to sell, and the lower will be the effective spread she will charge to a public-buy (i.e. dealer-sell) trade and the larger would be the effective spread she will charge 11 A public-buy (public-sell) trade is preferenced when it is executed by a dealer not posting the lowest ask (highest bid) price. A public trades is internalized if the broker firm is the same as the dealer firm. 12 In the context of the quality of execution, the mid-nineties have seen a major controversy over quoteclustering and collusion by dealers on the NASDAQ , Christie, Harris, and Schultz, 1995 , and Barclay, 1997 , a problem that was alleviated after the 1997 market reforms (described in Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz, 1999) . Quote clustering does not appear to have been a problem on the to a public-sell (i.e. dealer-buy) trade. This should translate into a negative (positive) slope coefficient on inventory in the regression in eq. (5) for public-buy (public-sell) trades. Table 6 reports the results of running the regressions of eq. (5) For public-buy trades, the effective spread charged depends significantly on ordinary inventories in a direction consistent with the inventory models only for large trades, and even for these trades the dependence is significant only at marginal significance levels (p-value about 0.1). For large public buy trades, dealers charge (based on their ordinary inventories) a marginally significantly lower effective spread of about ten basis points for a divergence of one standard deviation of ordinary inventory. In contrast, the effective spread charged to large public-buy trades does not depend significantly on any of the equivalent inventory measures.
For medium and small public buy trades, the effective spread charged does not depend significantly on any inventory measure, neither ordinary inventory nor any of the equivalent LSE, at least during the sample period (see Naik and Yadav, 2000) .
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inventories.
The strong and significant dependence of the quality of execution of public sell trades on ordinary inventory is being documented for the first time in the empirical market microstructure literature. However, what is more important from the perspective of this paper is that the equivalent inventory measures do not have significant explanatory power in these regressions. This suggests that the relative keenness of the dealers to execute (at least) public (sell) trades is consistent with their desire to reduce the divergence of their ordinary inventories rather than that of either measure of their equivalent inventory. These results, once again, reject the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Froot and Stein (1998) inter-dealer trades is generally zero while that charged for non-anonymous trades is generally half of the prevailing inside spread. These pricing norms do not allow dealers much flexibility in setting effective spreads, and therefore, effective spreads charged to inter-dealer trades on the LSE need not depend significantly on inventory and may not help in shedding light on the dealer behavior predicted by different models. Consistent with this expectation, when we run the regression in eq. (5) with inter-dealer trades, we fail to find a relation (not reported) between effective spreads charged in inter-dealer trades and any inventory measure.
Robustness checks
In section 4, we document strong results that the risk exposures arising from positions in correlated stocks is not an important determinant of trading behavior of dealers in individual stocks. In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to potential measurement errors in several ways.
First, we investigate whether the perceived absence of portfolio effects is driven by poor measurement. The most common manifestation of poor measurement is inadequate statistical resolution. However, in our case, the results are statistically very strong. The coefficients on ordinary inventory are consistently large in magnitude, of the same sign and statistically highly significant, while those on equivalent inventory measures are consistently very small in magnitude, often of varying sign, and statistically totally insignificant. It is true that the fact that a parameter estimate is not significantly different from zero for equivalent inventories is not a proof that the underlying parameter is in fact zero. However, the tstatistics are consistently so close to zero that is difficult to dispute the inference that the parameter is virtually zero, at least from an economic standpoint.
Second, we repeat our empirical analyses using inventory levels instead of relative inventories. Hence, we test whether public and inter-dealer trades are executed by dealers with negative (positive) inventory levels. Similarly, we test whether ordinary and equivalent inventory levels influence the quality of execution. We find that only ordinary inventory levels continue to explain dealers' trading behavior.
Third, we re-calculate the equivalent inventory measures by summing the second term in eq.
(1) over just those stocks for which the , j k β are significantly different from zero. Once again, we find that the results are virtually identical. In the same vein, we test the robustness of the conclusion to the way we estimate , j k β in eq. (1). Our earlier analysis estimated the , j k β ex-ante using historical returns. So, we re-run the analyses using equivalent inventories calculated on the basis of a perfect foresight , j k β estimated using in-sample returns. Once again, we find that only ordinary inventories are important determinants of dealers' trading behavior.
Fourth, in addition to our parametric test examining inventory distance of dealers executing public and inter-dealers trades (Table 5) , we also conduct a non-parametric test based on ranks where in we compare the rank of the dealer executing the trade with that of the median rank. We find that dealers with divergent ordinary inventory ranks, and not divergent equivalent inventory ranks, execute public and inter-dealer trades.
Fifth, six stocks in our sample (Asda Group, Land Securities, NatWest Bank, Enterprise Oil, Wellcome and WPP Group) either have ADR's listed on them on the NYSE and the NASDAQ, or have options listed on them on the London Traded Options Market, or both. This can potentially contaminate inventory measurement. Therefore, we repeat our analyses excluding these stocks and find qualitatively similar results.
Finally, we examine whether our results are being driven by stocks with relatively low levels of dependence on the systematic factors that arguably generate correlations between pairs of individual stocks. We expect the importance of portfolio effects to depend on the R 2 of the regression of the return of each of our sample stocks on systematic risk factors. We 27 proxy this by the R 2 of the regression on the main factor, i.e. market returns. Table 1 shows that, within our sample, the highest explanatory power of market returns is for NatWest Bank (63%), Spirax-Sarco Engineering (56%), and Land Securities (51%). We accordingly re-run our analyses for each of the twenty sample stocks separately. The results for NatWest Bank, Spirax-Sarco Engineering, and Land Securities are each qualitatively identical to the results for the whole sample. In particular, ordinary inventories, and not equivalent inventories (whether total or unhedgeable and whether firm-wide or industry-desk based) best explain the trading behavior of dealers.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate, for the first time, the importance of correlated exposures in the trading and pricing decisions of financial intermediaries. We compute the ordinary inventory positions of London equity dealers across all stocks using a particularly rich transactions dataset from the LSE. Following Ho and Stoll (1983) , and Froot and Stein (1998) respectively, we also construct dealers' total equivalent inventories and unhedgeable equivalent inventories in each individual stock, based on dependence between total returns and market-filtered returns. We examine whether the trading and pricing decisions of these dealers in individual stocks are more closely related to their ordinary inventory of that stock, or to either measure of their equivalent inventory. We construct equivalent inventory in two ways: one based on centralized market-making structure that aggregates correlated risk exposures across all stocks and the other based on an industry-desk based organisational structure that aggregates correlated risk exposures across stocks belonging to the same industry.
We find strong evidence that the decision-making of dealers is governed by their ordinary inventories, and not by either of their equivalent inventories. In particular, we find that dealers' ordinary inventories revert significantly more rapidly to the mean compared to either measure of their equivalent inventories. We observe that a dealer's quote changes are significantly related to her ordinary inventory changes and not to either measure of her equivalent inventory changes. We find that the dealers with divergent ordinary inventories, rather than divergent equivalent inventories, execute public trades and engage in inter-dealer trades. Finally, we find that dealers offer significantly better quality of execution to trades that reduce the divergence of ordinary inventories rather than trades that reduce the divergence of either measure of their equivalent inventories. Furthermore, these findings are robust to several alternative specifications.
Our findings strongly reject the predictions of the Ho and Stoll (1983) model and the Froot and Stein (1998) It is important to note that our finding of the lack of active ex ante risk management is not observable by us, we show below that the standardized inventories we use in our empirical tests do not depend on the initial inventory level.
In every stock, we consider all trades, public as well as inter-dealer, which dealer i executes in her capacity as a principal. We define , represents the intensity of mean reversion which depends on the relative inventory level, and t ψ is a white noise error term. This table reports the mean difference of standardized inventories between the dealer executing the trade and the median market maker, together with corresponding tstatistics. It reports the results separately for public trades and for inter-dealer trades, and within each category, it reports the mean difference separately for for large-size trades (trades greater than or equal to three NMS), medium-size trades (trades greater than one NMS but less than three NMS) and small-size trades (trades less than or equal to one NMS). 
Mean Reversion Coefficients
Ordinary
Public trades
